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Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

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# AIRGRAM

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A-93

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TO : Department of State

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INFO :  
DEPT PASS:

FROM : U.S. Delegation SALT, GENEVA DATE: December 18, 1972

SUBJECT : SALT MemCon

REF :

The attached SALT MemCon is to be reproduced and distributed in accordance with the memorandum to Mr. Miller, Deputy Executive Secretary, S/S, dated December 6, 1971 from Mr. Christopher, Special Assistant to the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

SMITH

Attachment:

Smith-Semenov Memcon  
December 15, 1972

EXEMPT-1

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FORM 3-70 DS-323

Drafted by:

SALDEL: WDKrimer

Clearances:

Drafting Date:

12-14-72

Phone No.:

Contents and Classification Approved by:

SALDEL: SNGraybeal

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SESSION TWO I  
A- 93

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION  
U.S. SALT DELEGATION  
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

DATE: December 15, 1972

TIME: 12:00 noon - 12:45 p.m.

PLACE: U.S. Mission, Geneva

SUBJECT: Smith-Semenov Post Mini-Plenary Conversation

PARTICIPANTS: US

USSR

Ambassador Gerard C. Smith  
Mr. William D. Krimer,  
Interpreter

Deputy Foreign Minister V.S. Semenov  
Mr. Yu. P. Klyukin, Interpreter

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December 18 Plenary re FBS

Smith told Semenov that he would make a statement on the forward-based systems question. Since the Soviet views had been presented in plenary format, Smith had instructions to reply in a plenary. Semenov acknowledged that he understood and considered this to be a good way to get on with our discussions.

Non-Transfer

Semenov said he understood the difficulties we may have with Mr. Grinevsky's statement at today's meeting and the proposal it contained (non-transfer), but would point out that it was a question of serious importance from the point of view of the security of both our countries. He wanted to draw Smith's attention to this issue and to say that it would be desirable to consider it in all its various aspects.

Smith said he did not disagree with this proposition. He thought that our difficulties in this connection were in terms of trying to think through and foresee what a non-transfer clause should be, before we had a better idea of which weapons systems would be subject to limitation. Once we had a clear understanding as to what would be limited, it should not be too difficult to work out an appropriate non-transfer clause.

Semenov said that this would have the effect of postponing the issue for a rather lengthy period of time. He believed that this principle was important in itself in terms of the near future of our

SECRET/NODIS

-2-

negotiations. He recognized that in the Interim Agreement we had provided for limitation for a specific period of time, in order to allow time for working out an agreement on more complete measures of limitation. This period of time had been set for five years. Naturally he would like to see us achieve agreement before the expiration of this period of time, but in any case working out such a more complete agreement would require some time, whether it was five years or less. During this interim the question of non-transfer thus acquired special importance. He recalled that at one time Smith had said that in our follow-on negotiations we should not lose sight of the question of third countries. This remark had been made with reference to the follow-on negotiations. His view was that our discussions were based on the premise that the present strategic situation had certain definite characteristics and that it would hardly serve the interests of either side to change the strategic situation by actions of one of the parties to the ongoing negotiations, by means of transfer, and thereby to catalyze something that both he and Smith would consider undesirable for both sides, from the point of view of the interests of our two countries and the interests of international security.

Smith asked if Semenov had in mind some sort of non-transfer arrangement that would be an independent understanding, even if we were not able to reach agreement on more complete limitations.

Semenov said he would not like to think that we would not succeed in our task. He saw no reason for us to make such a supposition. What he did have in mind was that we should give some serious thought to the whole matter of non-transfer.

#### Acceleration of Arms Programs

Referring to a typed brief, Semenov said that he wanted to draw Smith's attention to another issue touched upon in statements made by General Trusov and by Academician Shchukin, and dealt with accelerated MIRVing of U.S. land-based and sea-based missiles. He wanted to explain that this issue had not been raised by the Soviet side by way of reproach. In raising this issue, just as in raising other issues, the Soviet side proceeded from the interests of more productive discussions, bearing in mind the goals of our negotiations. He thought Smith would agree that accelerated MIRVing of missiles had an essentially destabilizing impact on the situation that had been created by the agreements concluded in Moscow. The question of MARVs was also important in this context. He believed that considerations on this score, too, should be the subject of careful study in preparation for the forthcoming phase of negotiations.

SECRET/NODIS

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-3-

Smith said that he had heard this word "acceleration," but did not understand how it applied to the subjects we were discussing. General Allison had already pointed out that there had been no acceleration in U.S. programs for MIRVing land-based and sea-based missiles. These programs had been proceeding at a certain rate when the May 26, 1972, agreements were signed, and presumably these agreements had taken account of programs of both sides. There had been no change in U.S. programs after May 26, and therefore Smith could not quite understand the Soviet reference to this issue.

Semenov said that if his understanding was correct, there had been a certain acceleration and some increase in allocations for these programs. Of course, he could be wrong, but he had read something to that effect in the press. On the other hand, he would point out that we were engaged in negotiations to limit strategic arms and to curb the arms race. Perhaps this question could be considered from that angle, since he had no doubt that it fell within the framework of the overall objectives of our negotiations. In saying this, he would somehow like to blunt the polemics and acuteness of this question and raise it in a positive manner.

Smith said that, as he understood it, we had a rather good agreement between us to the effect that research and development was something that would be very hard to control and would be very hard to verify if controlled. The first agreement, i.e., the Interim Agreement, makes no effort to control research and development. And it was his understanding that the Soviet leaders had told President Nixon that they intended to exercise all of their rights that were not limited by the agreements concluded, and that these programs would continue full blast. As for the MARV concept Semenov had mentioned, this was still very much in the research and development stage, and Smith did not quite understand why anyone should feel that our proceeding with it was not consistent with the letter and spirit of the agreements concluded on May 26, 1972.

Semenov said he saw that his remark had hit home, since he could see that; just as he had assumed, this issue could be viewed in an exclusively polemic manner. Naturally, these were complex matters, directly bearing on control of MARVs (he may have said MIRVs). He would say that this was just one aspect of a number of others related to the subject matter of our negotiations and that in the course of these negotiations some of these questions would need to be clarified. By way of an example, he would also mention the question of what should be done with the question of existing MIRVs. Viewing all of these matters in their broader perspective, they would evidently require additional thought and discussion. From the point of view of

SECRET/NODIS

-4-

developing the Soviet position it would be useful to use the interval between now and the next phase to reflect on all these matters.

Smith was not sure that he understood the distinction Semenov had drawn between viewing these issues in terms of polemics or in some other way. As for Semenov's remark that his considerations had appeared to hit home, Smith would say that all of Semenov's statements hit home. It was just a question of whether he could do something with these observations or not. If he had to take Semenov's observations on the continuing MIRV program of the United States being inconsistent with the May 26 agreements to his authorities, he would indeed have a difficult brief to argue. If in the next phase we were to get into discussion of qualitative limitations on such matters as MIRVs and control of accuracy, that was another matter. From what Semenov had just said, he had the impression that Semenov would like to get into the whole issue of qualitative limitations.

Semenov said that we had now entered into a new stage of negotiations. The present phase, of course, was of a preliminary nature. He thought it understandable and quite natural that we engage in trying to sound out possibilities of moving ahead in the various spheres that had not been covered by the May 26 agreements. He thought Smith had been right in saying that it was important to explore all possibilities for making progress in such an important area as limitation of strategic weapons and curbing the race in such weapons, with a view to subsequent reductions.

Smith returned to the question of acceleration during the post-May 26 period. He was sure that Semenov was aware of the fact that his people had been testing a naval SLBM, which, if fired even from its home port in the Soviet Union, could hit targets in the United States. He thought it would be well to give some thought to how the existence of such new weapons system would affect the Soviet argument regarding U.S. advantages in forward submarine bases, geography, and the ability to keep a certain number of subs on station. He would point out that if the range of this missile was of the order he mentioned, the question of geography and forward bases providing advantages to the U.S. would seem to him to disappear completely. In fact, when one looked at what this missile could do, he thought one would have to conclude that Soviet submarines in their own home ports would violate the Soviet proposal for subs to stay beyond the range of targets on the territory of the other country. This would seem to have the paradoxical effect that Soviet submarines would have to be moved away from Soviet ports. He was saying this in an effort to point out how

SECRET/NODIS

SECRET/NODIS

-5-

fast in his view technology could move ahead and how important it therefore was to get a political solution to such problems before it became impossible to solve them.

Semenov said that he could express certain considerations on Smith's thoughts even now, but he would prefer to have a chance to reflect on this matter and express his views at a later date.

SCC Documents

Smith referred to a point Semenov had made last night with reference to his ability to sign the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission and to initial a document regarding regulations for that Commission. Could Semenov give him any feeling whether or not it would be possible for him and Smith to sign the Memorandum and not to initial the guidelines for SCC Regulations, because as he had told Semenov last night, he had some difficulty in getting all the agencies in Washington to agree to all the paragraphs in the Regulations. He was not sure why this should be so, because after all the Regulations were of an advisory nature and the SCC would write its own detailed procedures. He did believe, however, that getting full clarification on the Regulations might require more time than we had available here. On the other hand, he thought he could get authority quickly to sign the Memorandum of Understanding.

Semenov said that his instructions at present linked the two questions together, i.e., his signing the Memorandum on behalf of the USSR Government in his capacity as Head of Delegation on condition that Smith would sign it on behalf of the U.S. Government in his capacity as Head of the U.S. Delegation. This authority was further linked to initialling the draft basic provisions that had been agreed at the working level ad referendum to Delegations. Consequently he would like to ask Smith to hasten clarification of the U.S. position. After all, the SCC would itself establish its own regulations, but it would still be important to agree on the draft basic provisions now. Such were his instructions. As for the draft Communique and the draft Work Program, so far he had not received an answer from Moscow, but expected positive instructions soon, because he had sent these documents to his authorities with the positive comments of his Delegation. We still had about one week and perhaps Smith could prevail upon his agencies to review the regulations again in a positive manner; after all, the question itself was not difficult. Smith said that he would try to use next week as positively as he could. Semenov remarked that this would be of political importance in itself and would also increase the significance of the current phase of our work.

*WDX*  
Drafted by: WDX:rim:wl  
December 15, 1972

*Gerard C. Smith*  
Approved by: Ambassador Gerard C. Smith

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